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Introduction 
      When one analyses the case of Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA), it is clear 
that aid to foreign countries, and Asia in particular, is not just an act of solidarity or 
complimentary help. In fact, it has been demonstrated that Japanese ODA entails national as well 
as private economic interest (Söderberg, 1996; Arase, 2007) and that there is a link between public 
policies and the diffusion of culture abroad (Anholt, 2009). In detail, my analysis will focus on the 
relationship between Japan and Vietnam, which at least since the first decade of the 21st century 
has been one of the fastest growing economies in South-east Asia, and Tokyo's ODA top bilateral 
recipient (OECD, MOFA 2012; Ohno, 2010).  
      One could argue that wealth and power are not all that a country needs to become a 
hegemon, meaning the ability to make other countries perceive its values as their own. For many 
decades, military power and wealth have been the main criteria to measure the role of a country in 
the international community. However, is it still possible to account for a country's role in the 
world or in a specific region just in terms of power and capital? Needless to say that the criterion 
of wealth is still crucial in the age of globalization: the world could be more peaceful and 
interdependent than before, but it is not more equal (Easterly 2007; Sumner 2013). Thus, the focus 
of the policy of a country in a position of dominance in the international system has shifted from 
showing individual power and/or wealth to showing its most appealing assets, like aid and culture. 
The aim of such policies is to get, where possible, other countries to cooperate thus attaining what 
will be perceived as a mutually beneficial gain (Nye, 1990). 
204 
 
 
      In the first section of this paper I shall present the main theories I have drawn upon in 
establishing the topic of  the present research 1 . After a brief summary of the mainstream 
approaches to international relations in the field of development, I will consider the ones deemed 
useful in order to develop a critical analysis of the topic. In addition, Simon Anholt's notion of 
competitive identity or nation branding (Anholt, 2009) will be taken into consideration. This 
concept is, in my view, particularly interesting when approaching IR in the context of 
globalization, as it underlines actual political or economic impact of public policies versus its 
symbolic value.  
      I will therefore present an account of the main historical features of Japanese ODA and 
Japan's role in Asia as a model for development in neighbouring countries and give a brief account 
of the case study (Vietnam) I intend to analyse. Finally, I will try to define the lines of future 
development for my research design, particularly focusing on the following questions: what is the 
future of Japanese foreign aid? What is the idea of “development” entangled in such a public 
policy? Is it possible to find in Japan any drive to a non-official development in Asia (via NGOs, 
social and environmental movements, common good movements). 
 
1. Theoretical Framework 
1.1 The Development Issue 
      Since 1945, the concept of development has been interwoven with that of nation-state: it 
can be related to the nation-state's economic growth, i.e. an increase of its national output, 
expressed by the increase of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); or it can be caused by an 
increase in the available factors of production (labour, capital and raw materials) or by an increase 
in the efficiency of their use (Sloman, Wride and Garratt, 2012: 41-43). Nevertheless, as some 
scholars (Sen, 1999, Todaro, 2009) pointed out, economic growth is only one aspect of 
development. According to Todaro, “development must be conceived of as a multidimensional 
process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and national institutions, as 
well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and the eradication of 
poverty” (Todaro, 2009:16).  
                                                 
1 The research will be carried out during a 3-year doctoral course at Ca'Foscari University of 
Venice, Department of Asian and North-African Studies. 
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      Against such a background, the definition of development could become highly 
controversial. What is development, then, and why is the international community so concerned 
about it? 
The United Nations have broadened the scope of its definition of development: in 1990s, 
UNDP focused on the notion of “human development”, as defined in 1990 by economists Mahbub 
ul Haq and Amartya Sen, which included an evaluation of life expectancy, education and health, 
and social inequalities. Every year, UNDP publishes a report and a ranking of the most developed 
countries in the world according to their Human Development Index (HDI). However, there still is 
a very clear a connection between affluent economies (as measured by more GDP-related statistic 
by IMF, World Bank or disposable wage-related statistic by OECD) and the level of human 
development2. 
 
1.2 Development as an ideology 
      Classical liberalism has it that all individuals in the world have the right to enjoy freedom 
of expression, private property and equal opportunities. So do nation-states that have to cooperate 
in order to avoid conflict and maintain peace and harmony in the international system. It is not a 
coincidence that after 1945 liberalism has become embedded in the rules of the international 
institutions created since, as a consequence of the US hegemonic position. However, it can be 
argued, this very system has inevitably favoured the USA and its allies, which are now able “to 
claim special rights and privileges over other members of the international society” (Dunne, 2011: 
109). 
      The relation between the “developed” and the “underdeveloped” is here crucial. 
Immanuel Wallerstein (2005) clearly identified the link between development and colonialism. In 
fact, during the colonial era, the concept of development was associated with that of mise en 
valeur, namely, following Wallerstein's analysis, exploitation and profitability (Wallerstein, 2005). 
From 1945 onwards, development became a “code word” for former colonies: being gradually 
recognized as nation-states by the international community, they could finally develop and 
“become as technologically modern and as wealthy as the countries of the North” (Wallerstein, 
                                                 
2 The Human Development Report 2013 can be consulted at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2013 (retrieved on February 9, 2014) 
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2005: 1264). In compliance with such a view, William Easterly (2007) claimed the birth of the 
ideology of the new millennium: developmentalism3. 
      However, such an account cannot disregard Wallerstein's view of a capitalist world-
economy, a world-system that is by definition unequal. Such global entity is divided in three 
zones: core-periphery and semi-periphery, which are necessarily linked together in a relationship 
that guarantees a continuing drainage of wealth from the periphery to the core (Wallerstein, 1974).  
      David Harvey (2006) maintains that in the last decade of the 20th century an effective but 
unequal “neoliberalization” of the global economy took place. This trend was favoured especially 
in the 1990s by the 'Washington consensus' (World Bank, International Monetary Fund and US 
Treasury Department): what Harvey calls the new economical “orthodoxy” revolved around a 
drive towards privatisation, financialisation, manipulation of economic crisis and State 
redistributions which had the effect of restoring class power (Harvey, 2006:153-155). IMF, and 
World Trade Organization since 1995, proved to be “convenient vehicles” through which US 
financial and political power could be exercised in a “global network of power relations”(Harvey, 
2006: 151). 
     In sum, according to critical scholars like Easterly, Harvey and Wallerstein, the triumph 
of neoliberal governance and globalization since 1980s has increasingly stressed asymmetric 
relations in terms of economic advance and political power while “development” has become 
nothing more than a slogan. Such a position, however, is supported by some empirical evidence: 
as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) stated in the 2010 Human Development 
Report, global inequality is, if not rising, very high (UNDP, 2010: 73). Roughly put, the richest 20 
percent of the world's population enjoys 75 per cent of the global output, whereas the poorest 20 
percent only enjoys 1,5 percent (Dunne, 2011: 109; Casari, 2003: 51).  
  
1.3 Power Relations in the Empire 
                                                 
3 William Easterly, an economist with the New York University Development Research Center, 
has compared developmentalism to other twentieth century ideologies, such as Communism and 
Fascism, which have produced damage and not reduced, rather they have increased inequalities in 
wealth distributions in the world. However debatable this view may be, it seems an interesting 
approach against the mainstream one that consider development, as defined by the framework of a 
few developed countries, as a necessity (Easterly, 2007). 
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      In this sense, I will posit that development policies have retained an “imperial” 
significance: development may still be seen as a mere “code-word” or as Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri underline, as a “discourse”. The so-called developed countries in the “global 
North”, provide aid and advice to the so-called underdeveloped “global South”, thus defining what 
development is or has to be. Such an aspect is decisive to the analysis of the two Marxist scholars, 
as developmentalist views strongly relies on unbalanced power relationships in the economic 
sphere (Hardt, Negri, 2000: 282). 
      Hence, the importance of the diffusion of developmentalist position through the diverse 
political, but most of all, financial institutions that contribute to operating the “Empire” (United 
Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank) in relation to conflict-prevention and economic stability in the global system 
by dominant countries. On the other hand, as Hardt and Negri posit, underdeveloped countries 
remain subordinate in the global system (Hardt, Negri, 2000: 283). In this regard, the increasing 
role of transnational organizations and international led to the establishment of precise sets of 
rules that constitute the foundation of what Hardt and Negri identify as a “decentered and 
deterritorialising apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its 
open, expanding frontiers” (Hardt, Negri, 2000: 34-37), namely the “Empire”.  
      As Hardt and Negri maintain, such a system is created in response to the contemporary 
crisis of the nation-state and implies for the national entities abiding to a globalised concept of 
rights and ethics. Nonetheless, it can be argued that inside Negri and Hardt's system, there is still 
room for some countries to exert some sort of economical and cultural hegemony on other 
countries. My analysis of Japan's aid policies to Asia moves precisely from such a description of 
the international system provided by the two scholars.  
 
1.4 The logic of branding a nation in the global market 
      Military power and national wealth have been two main factors of influence in traditional 
approaches to IR. However, the display and use of military power may not be appealing to other 
countries and may affect the country's national reputation. The origin of this concern could be 
traced back to Hans Morgenthau's concept of prestige, (i.e., the importance of how a country is 
perceived as strong by other countries) which is fundamental in the balance of power dynamic. 
However, a thorough analysis of the shift in the conception of power is that of Joseph Nye (1990).  
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      According to Nye since the end of 1970s the diffusion of technologies and sophisticated 
weapons in industrialized advanced countries as well as in less advanced countries have changed 
the nature of world politics. Thus, the ability of great powers “to control their environments” is 
diminished (Nye, 1990: 163). As a consequence, a way of exerting power alternative but at the 
same time coordinate to the military – co-optive or soft power (e.g., diplomacy, culture) – has 
emerged and has become more attractive than costly forms of coercion or hard power. To put it in 
Nye's words, co-optive power is “the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other 
countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own” (Nye, 
1990: 168).  
      Such a form of power may be efficient not only in a balance of power context, but also in 
market-oriented environment. As Simon Anholt noted,  
 
Today the world is one market; the rapid advance of globalisation means that every 
country, every city and every region must compete with every other for its share of the 
world's consumers, tourists, investors, students, entrepreneurs, international sporting and 
cultural events, and for the attention and respect of the international media, other 
governments and the people of their countries (Anholt, 2009: 206).  
 
      In the complexity of the contemporary world, people's (i.e.: consumers) perception of one 
country and its citizens tends to be mediated by clichés and stereotypes. Thus, it is the specific 
duty of every government to assess what images the world perceives about its country, and 
consequently to formulate a strategy to manage them in the most appropriate and profitable way 
(Anholt, 2009). Hence, nation branding becomes a public policy that involves the spreading of 
cultural as moral values from which dominant countries in the world system succeed in benefiting. 
      Nation branding policies are particularly worth studying when we approach Japan's 
international attitude towards Asia. If on the one hand Japan has established a good reputation 
thanks to its wealth and unprecedented economic development, which brought it among the top-
three world economies, as well as high-profile educative institutions; on the other hand, it had, and 
still has, to come to terms with its history of military aggression and expansionism less than a 
century ago. If one uses Anholt's approach, an efficient nation branding policy has to coordinate 
aspects concerning government bureaucracy (especially within the ministries dealing with 
economic, financial and foreign affairs) and the transmission of its culture abroad. Figure 1 clearly 
209 
 
 
shows factors like tourism, policy, investment and culture as significant to establishing a national 
reputation abroad. 
 
 
 
[Fig.1: Anholt's Hexagon of Competitive Identity; source: Anholt, 2009: 209] 
 
 
      In my view, contemporary nation branding policies, such as the Cool Japan campaign 
designed to promote Japanese popular culture abroad, cannot be fully understood without 
examining the role of Japan from the 1970s to the early 2000s as one of the world's top donors to 
developing countries especially in Asia.  
 
2. Japan as ODA top donor 
      In the modern age, Asia has always been fundamental to the development of Japanese 
economy. In the 1930's and 1940's under the drive of military imperialism, Japan established a 
regional empire. By the ruling elite it was perceived as a necessity: on the one hand, Japan 
perceived the external threat of Euro-American imperialism and opted for a developmental model 
focused on the motto fukoku kyōhei, rich country, strong army. On the other hand, territorial 
expansion could provide Japanese industrial conglomerates with natural resources and new 
markets4. 
                                                 
4 For a better understanding of Japanese imperialism, see Duus, Myers, Peattie (eds) (1998) and 
Oguma (1998 and 2002). 
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      After the defeat of the Empire of Japan in 1945, countries in Asia and South-east Asia 
that were occupied by Japanese military started claiming for war reparations. In the 1950s, leaving 
aside China, Korea and Taiwan, war reparations were evaluated in terms of Japanese assets and 
infrastructures, Japanese war reparations started flowing to countries that had been militarily 
occupied from 1941 until 1945. In 1952 Burma agreed on a 200 million dollar war reparation 
plan; in 1956, the Philippines reached an agreement on a 550 million dollar plan in yearly 
instalments over 20 years; in 1958, Indonesia accepted a 220 million agreement; Vietnam ratified 
the San Francisco Treaty, receiving nearly 39 million dollar (MOFA)5, barely a tenth of what they 
had asked for (Bouissou, 2003: 136). 
      There is no doubt that the then prime minister Yoshida Shigeru saw in this an opportunity 
to boost Tokyo's national interest, namely national security and prosperity (kokueki), in a more 
pacific, thus softer, way and to help Japan's postwar recovery. In fact, such disbursements 
provided the chance for the post-war leadership to rehabilitate Japan's national image in front of 
the newly born international community: especially with regards to the US, which became Japan's 
most prominent ally (tsukiai)6.  
      Moreover, if we consider South-east Asia's traditional richness in raw materials, it was an 
occasion, using the words of prime minister Kishi Nobusuke at a Budget committee of the House 
of Representatives in 1960, to secure “as many raw materials as possible, and sell manufactured 
goods overseas” (Sato, 2013:14). It is possible to argue that Kishi's words revealed a new interest 
towards Asia, which needed to be coordinated by a set of institutions (a research institute, a 
special fund and a bank for Asian development) through an effective economic policy. 
      However, a real implementation of this new and pacific “Asian policy” was enacted a few 
years later. Under the Ikeda administration, in 1964, Japan entered the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) as the first Asian country to be accepted in a Euro-
American institution. This diplomatic success gave Ikeda the possibility to put Japan on a different 
                                                 
5 Retrieved December 3, 2013 from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html 
6 The term kokueki means national interest; the term tsukiai means “company”,“association” even 
“friendship”. These two words acquire significance when we consider the scope of Japanese ODA 
in the 1970s. It was a process directed by both an endogenous (kokueki) and an exogenous pull. 
The concepts were introduced in the field of Japanese ODA studies by the scholar and UN advisor 
Hasegawa Sukehiro 's 1975 The objectives of foreign aid: Japanese aid for domestic prosperity 
and international ascendency and cited in Arase (2007). 
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position in the East-Asian frame of political and economical relationships. In those years, the 
gankō keitai (flying geese) paradigm gained popularity. According to this economic model of 
development defined by the Japanese economist Akamatsu Kaname (1961), industrial 
development is the leading force of economic development. This can be attained through the 
adoption of industrialised advanced countries' industries in order for a less advanced countries to 
catch up with them on the path of development (Korhonen, 1994). However, as Kasahara (2004) 
noted, when applied to the Japan-Asia relationship, during the mid-1960s, this paradigm implied a 
hierarchical structure with Japan at its top. Following this interpretation, a disparity in political 
and economic power between Japan and its Asian neighbours is apparent.  
 
2.1 Development institutions 
      Japan's ODA is a highly institutionalised and bureaucratised process that involves key 
ministries and agencies. The entire process is also monitored and coordinated by supranational 
institutions such as the OECD. In fact, OECD defines ODA as aid flows to countries and 
territories identified by the Development Co-operation Directorate that is “provided by official 
agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies” and “administered 
with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective”; it must be “concessional in character” and convey “a grant element of at least 25 
percent (calculated at a discount rate of 10 per cent)”(DAC-OECD, 1972). The high degree of 
institutionalization of Japanese foreign aid has attracted much attention from both economics and 
IR scholarships. Along with the recent work by David Arase (2007), Marie Söderberg (1996) 
described the main features of Japanese ODA, considering for the first time the recipient 
perspective, i.e., the impact of Japanese aid abroad. 
      Söderberg identified four main themes of analysis of Japanese ODA: first, the 
institutionalization of Japan's development aid, which is based on the request of the recipient 
country via formal diplomatic channels. Such a system leaves room for non public agents to be 
involved, as private companies and local leaders, experts or technicians (Söderberg, 1996: 55). As 
Arase adds, the decisional process can be complicated as it involves 13 bureaucratic actors at the 
cabinet level; in particular three main institutions are involved: the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) which is in charge of managing the requests for grant-aid; the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC) in charge of loans; and finally the Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). Some argues that such a system, which is unique among DAC 
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countries, often lacks transparency and coherence. Moreover, there have been reports of misuse 
and illicit appropriation of ODA funds by politicians7. 
      Second, the relationship between private and public sectors. ODA, as Söderberg stresses, 
are a fundamental ingredient of economic cooperation with the developing countries. In particular, 
Japanese business associations and entrepreneurs who in the mid-1980s started transferring parts 
of their productive activities abroad, especially in developing countries in Asia, like Indonesia and 
China, ODA is crucial in order to support Japan's competitiveness. That is why the keidanren, the 
most prominent association of Japanese entrepreneurs, is particularly keen to have ODA increased 
as they are crucial in developing the infrastructural frame necessary to support industrial 
production (communications, energy, etc.) . 
      Third, the relationship with the international institutions. Even if Japan has been the 
world's top donor in terms of total amount of aid provided (volume of aid) for 22 years (1989-
2001), several aspects of its ODA policy have fallen under criticism by DAC. To begin with, its 
geographical distribution. The flow of aid disbursement has been directed mainly to Asia 
(Söderberg, 1996: 34): in 1970s aid to Asia counted for the 80 percent of the total, in 65percent in 
1980s and still held a predominant position in the first decade of the 21st century (53 percent in 
2007-8) (Potter, 2012: 12); secondly, ODA disbursement as percentage of GDP (0,25 percent) lags 
far behind the 0,7 percent established as a target for the next decade at the Monterrey Consensus 
in 20028. Moreover, Japanese ODA, in comparison to other DAC countries, are less gratuitous as 
the interest rates on ODA loans are higher9. 
     Japanese ODA has also been criticized for being ineffective, due to  
                                                 
7 In 2002, an ODA-linked scandal involving MOFA bureaucrat and Liberal-democratic party 
(LDP) member Suzuki Muneo, and then minister of Foreign Affairs, Tanaka Makiko, had a great 
resonance among the public opinion. See Berkofsky (2002), 'Corruption and Bribery in Japan's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the case of Muneo Suzuki', Japan Policy Research Institute Working 
Paper, No 86, June 2002 Retrieved February 9, 2014 from 
http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp86.html 
8 The 0,7 percent target was reaffirmed in 2002 as the ratio of GDP “rich countries” should 
commit to Official Development Aid, in order to attain the UN's Millennium Development Goal 
and end poverty by 2030. 
9 According to OECD's data, in 2011 Japan received nearly 2,6 billion dollars in loan repayments. 
See http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/apr/30/aid-overstated-donors-interest-
payments (retrieved February 10, 2014) 
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 a relatively underdeveloped field presence; a limited capacity to engage recipients and 
other donors in a multilevel policy dialogue at the country level; low coherence in overall 
ODA policy direction and implementation due to bureaucratic factors; and difficulty in 
meeting actual recipient needs in technical cooperation (Arase, 2007: 14).  
 
     Such criticism has to be understood in terms of national polity. In fact, as both Arase and 
Söderberg maintain, since 1945, ODA has been a key element of Japanese nemawashi 
diplomacy10. ODA helped Japan to present itself to the world, and other Asian countries, as a 
“peace” country, trying to forge a national image alternative to the tremendous memories of the 
Empire of Japan's military expansionism. Finally, it must be noted that the domestic political 
debate has influenced ODA disbursement. Especially in 1990's, Japan's ODA has fallen under the 
criticism of politicians opposed to the LDP rule and civil society, as Japan lost its status of 
economic superpower. Japan needed first to help itself and then other countries (Arase, 2007: 4-5). 
Nevertheless, public involvement in the ODA decisional process is very limited. In addition, it 
must be emphasised that, despite pledges to enhance transparency and greater involvement from 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the ODA Policy Charter of 1992 and its revision in 
2003, more has to be done in terms of enlarging the scope of public debate around ODA 
(Williamson, 2011). 
 
2.2 Why Vietnam? 
      Choosing Vietnam as a case study is no coincidence. As Ohno (2009; 84-86) pointed out, 
since 2001, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has been among the top four recipients of Japan's 
aid.  
                                                 
10 As noted by Hook, Gilson, Dobson and Hughes, Japanese postwar diplomacy is characterized 
by three “key modes” to lay the groundwork needed for the deployment of Japanese power. One is 
the omote (surface or explicit) mode (e.g.: bilateral meetings at ministerial level);then there is the 
ura (back or implicit) mode (e.g: single members of parliament or political parties visits to China 
or North Korea) and the proxy channels' mode. These two “behind the scenes” modes are 
specifically identified by their focus on laying the groundwork (nemawashi) via an informal 
process of interaction (Hook, Gilson, Dobson, Hughes, 2005 :80). 
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Official Development Assistance has provided nearly two trillion yen in infrastructural 
and social development projects in the last few years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan's 
data)11. This trend is clearly illustrated by fig. 2, which refers to FY 2011. 
 
 
[Fig. 2: Japanese bilateral ODA in Asian countries; source: MOFA, Japan Official Development 
Assistance White Paper 2012] 
 
      ODA impact has been particularly relevant since 1993, when Tokyo and Hanoi 
normalized their relations, and the bilateral ODA flow restarted after a 20 year hiatus. The case of 
Vietnam clearly shows that Japanese aid is mainly directed to middle-low income countries (as 
identified by UN's HDI ranking), contradicting the DAC guidelines on boosting help to the least 
developed countries (Potter, 2012: 17). As figure 2 shows, Japan's aid initiatives in Vietnam focus 
on a) infrastructural and poverty reduction projects, financed through ODA loans (National 
Highway N.1, North-South Express way, Hanoi's Noi Bai airport, power plants, etc.; Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit); b) grant assistance to scholarships and environment-linked projects 
(Human Resource Development Scholarship; Afforestation in Central and South Vietnam); c) 
technical cooperation (Training in food, education, public health and fund management sectors) 
                                                 
11  Available data updated to F.Y. 2011; retrieved September 28, 2013 from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/kuni/12_databook/pdfs/01-07.pdf 
215 
 
 
(MOFA, 2012)12. Figure 3 shows in greater detail the relative amounts of Japanese aid from 2007 
to 2011. 
 
 
[Figure 3. Japan's ODA to Vietnam (2007-2011); source: MOFA, OECD/DAC, 2012] 
 
      Bilateral diplomatic relations were in place since 1973 but remained cold after the demise 
of South Vietnam and the newly born Socialist Republic of Vietnam's rapprochement with the 
USSR. However, it is worth noting that one of the main aim of the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, which 
marked a new era in Japan relations with Asia, was to “support ASEAN” with “economic means”, 
leaving room for a deeper cooperation with Hanoi that at the time was seen with suspicion by the 
member countries of the Association (Bouissou, 2003: 233).  
      Since 1986, Vietnam has undergone a process of massive political and economic process 
of reform, called doi moi (literaly “renovation”). This state-mediated process of opening the 
country to the global market economy spurred an unprecedented growth, which helped to reduce 
poverty by a third and favoured the transition from an import-substitution economy to an export-
oriented one. In 1995, Vietnam joined ASEAN and secured a stronger relationship with Japan and 
the other South-east Asian countries. The joining of ASEAN was followed in 1998 by that of 
APEC and finally in 2007 after a long negotiation, of WTO, thus ensuring fairer access for 
Vietnam exports to the international market (Kokko, 1998: 319-321). 
      With the launch of the Japan-Vietnam Joint Initiative in 2003, under Koizumi 
administration, the relationship between the two countries gained further strength. In fact, 
eonomic cooperation has ushered in activism by Japanese cultural institutions as the Japan 
                                                 
12 Further details on the entity of Japanese aid in Vietnam can be found on Japan's Minister of 
Foreign Affairs website at the link: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/data/pdfs/vietnam.pdf 
(retrieved February 9, 2014) 
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Foundation in further promoting Japanese language education in Vietnam as well as artistic, 
cultural and scientific exchange between the two countries13. For instance, in November 2013, a 
Japanese film and animation festival was hosted in Hanoi with the support of the Japanese Agency 
for Cultural Affairs and the Japanese Image Council to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Japan-
Vietnam bilateral relations and enhance mutual cultural comprehension14. In this regard, how is 
the bilateral relation perceived in the public sphere? Did ODA play a role in establishing a positive 
image of Japan as a “developed country” among the Vietnamese public?  
     In 2012 AUN Consulting Inc., a Japanese marketing consultancy agency, conducted a 
survey among the top 10 Asian countries by GDP (Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) on their people's degree of fondness of 
Japan. Answers from 100 male individuals for each country, aged 18 on, were collected. The 
results (Figure 4) show that the country where Japan is appreciated the most is Vietnam. Nearly 97 
percent of the interviewed responded positively, confirming the good reputation Japanese enjoys 
in the country (AUN Consulting, 2012). As shown by the survey, the Vietnamese’s fondness of 
Japan is higher than that of Thai and Filipino. 45 per cent of Vietnamese responders told AUN 
Consulting that they “like Japan very much”, while 52 per cent told that they “like Japan”15.  
 
                                                 
13 It is important to note that Hanoi's Japan Foundation Center for Cultural Exchange opened in 
2008, as one of the newest overseas office of the organization. A statement with the Center aims 
and projects can be found here http://jpf.org.vn/jp/about-us/brief-introduction/ (retrieved on 
February 11, 2014) 
14 See 'Betonamu de Nihon animation tokushu jōei, gekiba anime kara tampen made 19 sakuhin' , 
Animeanime.jp, November 2, 2013, retrieved February 11, 2014 from 
http://animeanime.jp/article/2013/11/02/16171.html 
15 The survey was articulated in five questions: 1. Do you like Japan? 2. Do you like Japanese 
people? 3. Would you go to Japan on a trip? 4. Do you like Japanese goods and services? The 
possible answers were: “like very much” (daisuki); “like” (suki) “don't like” (kirai); “hate” 
(daikirai). The majority (97 per cent) of Vietnamese respondents declared that they like (suki) 
Japan or they like it very much (daisuki); 98 per cent of them answered positively to the second 
question as well. The third question presents slightly different outcomes, as respondents from 
Philippines (95 per cent) and Singapore (94 per cent) showed more interest in tourism to Japan. 
Finally, 62 per cent of Vietnamese respondents said they “like very much” Japanese products and 
services. Retrieved February 10, 2014 from 
http://www.globalmarketingchannel.com/press/2012110602 
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[Figure 4. Reputation Survey: Do you like Japan? Source: AUN Consulting, Ajia 10ka koku 
shinnichi do chōsa (November 2012)] 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
      As shown above, developmental issues are highly debated. International organizations 
such as UN, OECD, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have tried to get rich 
countries to cooperate in order to reduce the development gap between the first world and the third 
world through developmental aid initiatives. The results are not very encouraging, as those 
supranational institutions are accused of not being democratic and influenced in their decisions by 
the world's richest countries in their decisions (Dunne, 2011: 111). Critics as Easterly (2007) 
argue that the guidelines for development aid agreed on by those countries as disregarding the 
viewpoint of the recipients of their aid. In fact, criticism from NGOs, independent research 
institutes and media is that ODA masks public and private interests15. It is then possible to argue 
that the definition of development itself depends on unequal power relations between nation states 
in the international system. 
 
      In the case of Japan, these features have been here briefly examined. However, in order to 
have a better insight on the matter, one cannot overlook the historical importance that Asia has 
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had in Japanese history spurring Tokyo's strive for regional leadership. The need, on the one hand, 
for raw materials and for an outlet for commodities and investments by domestic industrial groups 
on the other has driven such a peaceful economic activism by the Japanese governments since 
1945. To this end, one could argue that development has become one of the main elements of the 
Japanese national brand. If one considers the developmental state model that Japan has helped to 
introduce in developing countries across Asia since the 1960s, the era of Chalmers Johnson's 
“Japanese Miracle” (Johnson, 1982), thanks to Tokyo's aid programmes, one cannot help but to 
identify a clear hierarchical structure, which reflects dichotomies, such as the North/South and 
developed/underdeveloped, still recognizable in the contemporary world.  
     If on the one hand, official aid policy's effectiveness in the infrastructure sector, 
especially in low growth countries, has been ascertained (e.g. Kasuga, Morita, 2009), on the other, 
it appears clear that ODA to Asia, and Vietnam in particular in the last decade, can be interpreted 
as a political means through which Japanese governments (mainly LDP-led) have enhanced 
favourable environments for private investments by Japanese industries. However, achievements 
in what UNDP identifies as human development should be better considered. Furthermore, for a 
future development of my research it will be useful to investigate ODA awareness in the Japanese 
civil society and how the Tokyo's branding endeavour is perceived abroad, through interviews 
with social actors, representatives of the state institutions and NGO involved in the ODA process. 
Moreover, it will be of particular interest to study social alternatives to official aid for 
development programmes in the non-public sphere. Thus, a multidisciplinary approach that 
entangles IR and social studies seems the most appropriate to deal with the subject. 
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